Today, Malta’s prime minister Robert Abela gave the clearest indication yet of the foreign policy thinking from the EU’s smallest member state on Russia and Ukraine, and Trumpworld.
These are the takeaways:
1. Ukraine cannot win against the Russian war of aggression. The EU states tub-thumping for Ukraine are not being realistic about this war of attrition.
2. Malta wants a close relationship with the U.S. and wants the EU to safeguard the transatlantic alliance. “This allergy to Trump is a mistake.”
3. Malta, a neutral state, prefers a Trump-led ceasefire agreement than increased European spending for the war economy. “It would be Trump’s merit to have achieved this ceasefire… I believe the U.S. will achieve this ceasefire.”
4. If America gets its rare earth minerals shakedown deal, it would lock in U.S. strategic interests in Ukraine – a security guarantee writ large. “Unfortunately there are many who refuse to consider the prospect that it would be in America’s interest to safeguard this deal for the long term.”
5. “Europe is divided” over the prospect of spending for war.
Well, you can hear it all here. And domestically, this line will be taken up in its entirety by Abela’s voters to suspect European defence priorities against Russia, and by association, those who support the hawks’ line (like EP President Roberta Metsola). Updated: this Labour MEP, Daniel Azzopardi, fleshes out the line here.
Be it political opportunism or realism of micro-states trying to keep their heads above the water-line, Malta’s centre-left prime minister is not joining the anti-Trump bandwagon, and he is certainly not aligning himself with the defence hawks or European exceptionalism on Ukraine.
So what first started as cautious talk in the way opprobrium towards Russia is framed, the uncommitted stance on Ukraine seems to have crystallised in favour of the Trumpworld peace deal.
Malta, a price-taker in international relations, has little business in banging any drums of war. Its military neutrality is a constitutional clause that conditions its diplomatic stance: ultimately, in the anarchy of international states, Malta’s only defence is international law (even though, Trump is hardly enamoured of any rules-based system that he cannot influence).
Naturally Robert Abela can have a different view of Putin from, say, the Finns. Former Finnish PM Alexander Stubb says Putin harbours imperialist ambitions and that he is a hater of European liberal democracy.
Malta, on the other hand, might be convinced that Putin is simply not in a position to conquer Ukraine, let alone Eastern Europe, and is therefore less convinced of the need to direct €800 billion in national spending and EU loans towards rearmament. After all, the Russian army has spent the past three years struggling to conquer the eastern border of Ukraine. And Russia’s GDP is smaller than other European countries, and has a smaller population. And like Ukraine it too is struggling to staff its army.
In itself this makes one wonder whether Putin’s back-channels to Trump are seeking a fast end to a war they can no longer afford…
But I do wonder whether the Maltese administration – wary of the unnecessary provocation of superpowers and other regional aspirants – suspects that NATO overreached in wooing Ukraine and Georgia into its stream; whether it thinks the principle of indivisibility of security applies here and that the security of one state (Ukraine joining NATO, for example) cannot be achieved at the expense of another’s security (Russia) – which would therefore somehow, justify why Russia was ‘provoked’ in escalating into an invasion of Ukraine.
But go tell that to Ukraine after Russia took Crimea…
It seems almost clear that with Robert Abela’s unabashed statements, Malta may have actually been tapped by the White House to resume its 1989 role to host peace talks on Ukraine (especially considering that the foreign minister bagged an invitation to that White House after-party).
That Malta preens itself on its aversion to war, could keep it in good stead with the strange Trump-Putin friendship that is emerging. The honest broker principle is not just foreign policy shtick; it could mean survival in the endless contestations on the world stage.
But what happens if that ceasefire Abela is confident about, deals a blow to international principles, by demanding the international recognition of Crimea as Russian? Would that not undermine international law? That is something Trump – who has blurted out his own expansionist wish-list for Panama and Greenland – would certainly not mind.
Trumpworld 2.0, and the end of the West
The transatlantic alliance is teetering on the edge – while European leaders see the war in Ukraine as an existential struggle, Trump wants to curtail U.S. involvement and finds no problem in striking a deal with Moscow on his own terms.
On the axis of superpowers, you can only see America on one side, and China on the other – if Trump sees the EU as a nuisance, it makes all the more sense to get Putin (to whom he is undoubtedly beholden for better or worse) on his side, and away from the Chinese behemoth.
How best to upend the Western alliance?
1. Empower nationalist forces that dislike the EU’s supra-nationalism;
2. Embolden the Russophile far-right parties that also dislike the EU;
3. Withdraw the guarantees of friendship – security and enonomic.
There’s no other way to say it. Europe is no longer America’s girlfriend, and while it is feeling out whether Trump might still fancy some break-up sex, it will have to think about starting all over again.
So: with Trump’s view of foreign policy now unashamedly transactional and only rooted in American power, security guarantees are no longer a given, but bargaining chips for economic and geopolitical negotiations.
This is simply the blunt reality of how Trump sees America’s role in the world, and his dislike of the EU: any sort of European evolution into a defence union, a beacon of human rights, a regulator of aggressive American neoliberalism, or a self-reliant energy union, is disliked by those who want the Old Continent to be beholden to American arms or Russian gas.
With 27 prime ministers and unelected leaders jostling for influence, Trump can smell Europe’s weakness, so it will be hard for the EU to withstand his divide-and-rule tactics. That is why we might see Europe’s centre of gravity shift back to national leaders like UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and France’s Emmanuel Macron, who are keen on forging ad hoc alliances with countries like Turkey and Canada, and to keep out problematic EU states who slow down defence plans or kowtow to Trumpworld.
Dollars on his mind: Tariffs and currency wars
This is to me the most important aspect of the past weeks of Trumpian chaos – the madness hides the sophisticated ruthlessness in trying to prop up the U.S. dollar against the economic powerhouses who are major exporters to the U.S. The argument has been made by former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis.
Trump wants to lower the American trade deficit, that is, the excess of imported goods and services from Europe and China over more expensive American exports.
What this means for America is that more dollars flow out of their country; dollars that are hoarded by the central banks of Europe and China because it is the dominant currency of the international financial system. In turn, these central banks use these dollars to buy American debt on Wall Street, and so the cycle goes on.
Now while this actually allows a powerful economy like America to run large spending deficits because it will find this ready supply of dollars, and allows it to decide who gets sanctioned in the international payments system, this privileged status has also made the dollar expensive.
So how can Trump (i) lower the value of the dollar, yet also (ii) retain the hegemony of the safe international reserve?
He uses tariffs and the withdrawal of security guarantees, to shock foreign economies into negotiations on a depreciation of their competing currency, because he thinks these currencies’ cheaper value make European and Chinese exports more competitive.
It looks like classic playground bullying:
1. Trump might want Europeans to spend more (pay for war) in American weapons (at an appreciated Euro no doubt);
2. If Americans like BMWs so much then he wants to see German manufacturing plants operating in the U.S. (to qualify for duty-free access to the U.S. market, carmakers need to show that 75% of the value of the vehicles they assemble originates within North America, among other rules);
3. He wants competing countries to sell their dollar assets in exchange for their own.
Can Ukraine win the war, and what wil happen to Zelensky?
Clearly, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine was intended to be over in a couple of weeks. Here we are in its third year, with what was once considered to be one of the mightiest forces in the world, struggling with a costly war of human resources and hi-tech weapons, and weathering the brunt of international sanctions.
And yet it does not look like Russia is edging closer to victory with a Ukraine that keeps resisting with Europe’s support. And it is not unreasonable to suspect an embattled Russia’s back-channels with Trump are clamouring for an end to war.
But will Ukraine have to concede land? Russia has violated important international law treaties, so what would the message sent to the international community be if Russia gains territory through illegal action? Watch out Panama and Greenland…
Volodymyr Zelensky remains a leader of remarkable resilience. His wartime presidency has been defined by personal bravery. But he is not immune to the shifting political realities shift both at home and abroad.
Trump is already engaging with rival Ukrainian figures, which raises the possibility of destabilisation. There is no guarantee that Zelensky will not be undermined by those with competing visions for Ukraine’s future. He himself is a media-savvy populist who was an outsider that upended the establishment. The same political forces he once disrupted will circle back against him.
But Trump’s push for Ukrainian elections aligns conveniently with Vladimir Putin’s objectives. For Moscow, an election in wartime means weakening Ukraine from within, for Zelensky is the embodiment of Ukraine’s resistance. Yet even domestic sentiment at home might also favour concessions in return for peace: according to The Economist, internal polling indicates that General Valery Zaluzhny, a central figure in Ukraine’s military strategy, would defeat Zelensky if an election were held today.
Europe without America
European leaders are starting to adjust to the reality of a diminished U.S. security guarantee. How bold will this attempt to address industrial and strategic shortfalls in Europe be? Will Europe give meaningful security guarantees for Kiev?
This week the European Commission said it will make available €150 billion in defence loans (that have to be repaid – it’s not a grant); and to raise, through national governments’ spending, €650 billion that will not be accounted for in terms of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. So essentially, the EC will relax the debt/deficit rules on this kind of spending.
All 27 member states have backed ReArm, Malta included – even while the prime minister spends a lot of time in rhetoric to rue its warlike nomenclature and repeatedly stating that “Malta will not participate in it” (what it really means is that, we are not geographically close enough to care about a Russian invasion to spend on defence).
Roberta Metsola, the president of the European Parliament, can easily celebrate ‘rearmament’ – she has no country or national army to send to war. Ironically, MEPs will not be consulted on ReArm: Ursula von der Leyen triggered a fast-tracking clause that will not require the EC to seek consultation from the Parliament (but instead go straight to the Council of Ministers).
For even this creative financial proposal is no straightforward path for Europe: the EC might seek to redirect Cohesion policy funds to defence, a controversial choice that will involve sensitive trade-offs. Malta would be expected to use its voice in the EU to oppose such a diversion of funds.
But unity is crucial for the EU. The real question is whether these commitments will translate into concrete action for Europe to create a non-American deterrent, with the political resolve to act in a crisis, and then fast enough to respond to challenges ahead.
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